NCFA

SUBMISSION PACKET

I. Forward

This packet was developed for submission to the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) by the California National Guard (CNG). It is designed to provide a state perspective on the challenges facing our Total Army. This packet is supplemental to the testimony provided during the Commission's California visit and includes key findings, facts, research and analysis critical to decisions related to the size and force mixture of the future Total Army. In an effort to provide relevance to the questions facing the Commission it has been drafted in two parts; the first, directly addressing subject areas mandated in the Commission's charter, and second, describing potential future scenarios promoting the agile, seamless and cost-effective force we believe America's Total Army can and should become.

Our military is faced with unique global challenges; conventional and asymmetric, domestic and international, economic, military and political. These challenges span the spectrum of the Army's Operating Concept, and affect the whole of our military; its personnel, resources and systems. America's largest military resource; its Army, is facing these challenges at the twilight of 14 years of sustained combat operations and under the specter of significant cuts to its budgets and structure. In the midst of these challenges however lies great opportunity to fundamentally relook and retool the Army to make it the adaptive and decisive force our nation requires.

Maintaining a relevant, cost effective Army requires capitalizing on our strengths and minimizing points of friction and inefficiency. Though the components of our Army have been forged into a relatively well-integrated team in combat, they remain separate at home, and it is that separation that this document seeks to fundamentally challenge and reshape. It is that separation that has led to a lack of understanding in our force, and ultimately to the inefficient employment and utilization of its true capabilities.

This is not the first effort of its kind within our military, or within our Army, so this paper seeks to draw on both lessons of the past as well as modern data to shape the critical arguments facing the Commission. Much can be learned from similar efforts including the recent National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force on which this current Army commission was generally based.

Regardless of the solutions that are promoted in this document, or ultimately championed by the Commission, one thing ought to be made abundantly clear: that America has but one Army, and every Soldier that bears its banner remains critical to its success. We shares the same values, patriotism and desire to selflessly serve, and each bring unique and critical capabilities to the fight. It is from this perspective that we urge the Commission to thoughtfully consider the arguments made here and to imagine the results when this force is efficiently designed and resourced, and the capabilities of its personnel fully enabled.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

The challenge before this Commission is to provide a vision for a future Total Army that effectively balances capability, cost and responsiveness and does so in the most efficient way possible. The analysis, observations and recommendations in contained in this report demonstrate the value and capabilities of today's Reserve Component and of the National Guard in particular. Today's operational National Guard is an adaptive, agile force capable of executing a broad spectrum of missions at home or abroad. It represents a distinct departure from the strategic reserve of the past and has proven itself repeatedly in 14 years of sustained combat and disaster response. Despite our force's evolution it continues to be misunderstood by some who still view the Guard through the optic of decades old anecdotes or believe that because it responds frequently to emergencies it is somehow less capable in its combat role.

Issues of **Scalability, Cost-Efficiency, Capacity, Personnel Base, Operational Tempo and Dwell** and **Strategic and Operational Risk** are all discussed in this *NCFA Charter Topics*, in terms of the current capabilities of our force.

The Army's controversial **Aviation Restructuring Initiative** and its potential impacts on total force readiness are also addressed along with an alternative plan to mitigate these issues.

If there is no other takeaway from this paper it ought to be that the modern National Guard is among the most broadly capable and adaptable military forces in the world and the diversity of backgrounds and experience within its corps of Citizen Soldiers are what make it that way. The Guard ought not to be considered as a complementary force, but rather as a highly adaptive force ready to execute the full spectrum of missions envisioned in the Army's Operating Concept. The only significant operational differences between Guard and Active forces have to do with time to employment, which is generally a function of readiness that can be adjusted according to resources as well as the requirements of any particular mission.

While the first part of this paper provides data and statistics to support the operational effectiveness of today's Guard, the real potential exists in the Guard of tomorrow and what that force can provide as part of a seamlessly integrated future Total Army. The ideas discussed in the second part of this paper; *the Way Ahead*, address ideas and concepts, both evolutionary and revolutionary, that provide a vision for what that future army might look like if some of the traditional labels and assumptions are set aside.

Creating a truly integrated and seamless Total Army will require not just a change in mindset but also changes to personnel systems, employment authorities, force structure, stationing and resource apportionment that will fundamentally reshape and enhance our force.

Creating an effective system that supports true **Continuum of Service** will allow Soldiers to simultaneously enhance and retain the capabilities of the force while simultaneously supporting the individual needs and goals of service members.

The current force allocation decision process is flawed, producing an unbalanced force that doesn't properly protect the populace or maximize the potential efficiencies of blended and

mutually supporting force structure. New **Apportionment** models could better deliver force structure congruent with the nation's demographic and geographic realities that were more sustainable, more efficient and could more effectively execute respond to operational and strategic requirements.

The **Phased Readiness Model** for composition and employment of Brigade Combat Teams provides one potential vision for what a truly integrated force structure might look like and how it might be utilized to provide a more effective and efficient expeditionary capability as well as a more responsive operational capability at home.

Finally, part of achieving a seamless Total Army means promoting mutual understanding and finding a way to speak with a more singular and harmonious voice. In the current situation the question of **Who Speaks for the Guard?** is unclear to many in DoD, in Congress and within the Guard itself. There needs to be a better way to express both consensus and dissenting views from across the 54 states and territories in a manner that is both productive and efficient.

The ideas suggested in this paper are oriented towards the goal of capitalizing on the inherent strengths and value propositions of our components and leveraging them to the strategic and fiscal benefit of our nation. Today's Army is great, but tomorrow's has the potential to be significantly better; more adaptive and efficient and better able to face the demands of the unknown and unknowable future.

II. Background: How we got here

a. The Budget Control Act and Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI)

Competition for declining post-war resources and the looming dictates of the Budget Control Act (BCA) have challenged defense planners and DoD leadership to re-look structures and programs across spectrum of service components and activities. Within America's Army, where some of the most significant cuts are to take place, the challenge is especially acute. Since 2012, the Total Army has cut 80,000 Soldiers and shuttered 13 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). (Tan, 2013) Downsizing and budget cuts are nothing new to the Army. Following every major conflict there has come a time when the Army has been forced to consolidate, but it is the proposed method and means of consolidation that brought this Commission into being.

From the perspective of the 54 states and territories the decisions made by the Army on how to implement these cuts were made in a vacuum and without their input or consent. While there is some debate over whether National Guard Bureau (NGB) was properly consulted, there is little debate that the outcome of the Army's decisions were largely unacceptable to the Adjutant's General. This prompted further questions over the appropriate role of NGB in representing the states as well as questions regarding where objectivity in determining the fate of our Army was supposed to come from. One of the results of that broader discussion was this Commission and its charge to look at our Army's future across components as well as to address the immediate and pressing topic of the Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI).

The ARI is a controversial cost cutting plan which would retire the Vietnam era OH-58 Kiowa Scout Helicopters and replace them with AH-64 Apache Gunships taken from the National Guard. The Army contends that, once fully implemented, it would save $1.09 billion a year (Freedberg, 2015). The Army National Guard challenged the assumptions of the Army and the criteria that were used to make those decisions. The Adjutants General were not consulted in regards to ARI despite the plan having the effect of taking all attack aviation out of the Guard. Compromise proposals and alternatives were submitted but it became clear that the Army was not willing to compromise or negotiate with the States. The stark difference of opinion on this matter begin to bring to the forefront a divide between components that had been greatly diminished during fourteen years of sustained combat operations.

Instead of working as a team to manage the deep cuts, the Active Component Army and National Guard were forced into opposing positions. Although the other services, most notably the Air Force, have successfully adopted the Total Force Policy, the Army continues to struggle with it despite the clear need to foster a cohesive "Total Army." Budget pressures and a shrinking force have helped to erode years of hard-won mutual trust and confidence and the effects have been borne out in both public and private dialogues on these topics. While the current situation presents negatives, it also presents an opportunity for real and productive dialogue that can shape and guide the future of our Army and mold it into the right force to meet both the present and unknown future conflicts faced by our nation.

b. This is nothing new

This isn't the first time our Army has sought to reform or to develop better synergy and efficiency from its components. As Chief of Staff of the Army in 1972, General Creighton Abrams purposely restructured the force so that it could not deploy to a major conflict without relying on the Guard and Reserves. What Abrams restructuring effectively did was ensure that when the U.S. military went to war, the Reserves had to come along, and by extension so did the American people. Abrams outlined the goal of implementing the "Total Force Policy" as the essential task in bolstering the readiness and responsiveness of the Reserve Components, and integrating them fully into the total force.

While the Air Force and Marine Corps have made significant progress in integrating their Active and Reserve Component formations, the Army has lagged behind. Reserve Component Army units were used sparingly in combat until the most recent conflict where prolonged engagements and an overtasked Active component forced the issue. This Commission, Congress, Defense and Army leaders now have an opportunity to learn from some of the trials and efforts of the past to develop solutions for the future. Key to a future solution will be a much greater understanding of the true capabilities and limitations of the Reserve Component and of the Guard in particular. Cultural and operational misconceptions about the Reserve Component (generally negative ones) continue to persist despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Despite its easy accessibility and proven combat performance over 14 years, mythology persists about the Guard being hard to get to, taking too long to train-up or being somehow less-capable force than active forces.

For this discussion to advance effectively it is important to focus on facts rather than emotion or vitriol. Otherwise productive efforts at multi-compo integration have failed for such reasons. Arguments and insights related to these efforts have been submitted to the NCFA and appear in such documents as: **Roundout Brigades: a Historical approach, Déjà vu all over again/Silent War : The Relevancy of Army National Guard Divisions, and The Army of the Future must be fully integrated with the National Guard.** The multi-component concept was tried in the 1990s under round-out/round-up but never took off due in part to a lack of commitment on the part of Senior Leadership as well as a false perception of Reserve Component ineffectiveness (Delk 2015). The dual status of the National Guard and a general lack of Active Army leadership knowledge and understanding of what the reserve components are capable of made it easy for conflicts to arise and persist (Brandt, 2015).

The previous Chief of Staff of America's Army testified recently before Congress that National Guard units train only 39 days a year, when in fact that number represents only the absolute minimum training requirement and the actual average is closer to 93 days (CAARNG Duty Days Served Analysis, 2014). The 39 days perspective also fails to assign any value to training or experience gained by Guardsmen in their full time occupations or during non-compensated time in between drills and training events. It also fails to recognize that after weekends, holidays and leave are taken into account the amount of actual training days available to the active army is closer to 220 (Wood, 2012). This fundamental lack of understanding among even senior Army leaders has plagued efforts at effective integration. It is these misconceptions as well as the opportunity for efficient future integration and design that this paper seeks to address.

III. NCFA Charter Topics

The following paragraphs address specific subject areas delineated in the Commission's charter. They reflect our perspective on these topics along with supporting local and national data.

a. Scalability: '*has the depth and scalability to meet current and anticipated requirements of the combatant commands*; '

Scalability in this context is the capability of our Army's structures and processes to accommodate a range of missions and requirements and to flex our force structure to meet them. A further consideration within any discussion of scalability is cost and efficiency. The fundamentally modular nature of our current Brigade Combat Team (BCT) structure allows for independent operations to be conducted effectively from the Battalion task force level up through Division level without significant alterations in task organization or structure. The current distribution of BCTs and Division HQs in both the active component and National Guard generally support scalability and depth within the force. There are however, limitations to the current model because it funds an overabundance of Active brigades that are unlikely to be immediately employed while simultaneously underfunding a nearly equal number of Guard brigades. What is left is a situation that from an economic and efficiency standpoint isn't really scalable at all, meaning that there isn't a continuum of force structure available along the full range of readiness/deployment timelines. What we have instead is a very costly solution that provides our nation with a fundamentally non-scaleable 'either/or' option. Later in this paper we propose a continuum of force model for BCTs that provides a template for significantly greater scalability without a significant loss in capability (see page 29).

The general concept of the BCT and of Div HQs is sound and it is important to note that outside of the percentage of full-time manning (100% for Active Component BCTs and approx. 3% for National Guard BCTs) the structures, equipment and capabilities are generally identical in both components. All that differs is the mobilization timeline for these units and even that timeline varies widely depending on the mission set. National Guard BCTs routinely mobilize, deploy and redeploy over the course of drill weekends multiple times a year and in most states are expected to deploy within 24 hours for military operations in the homeland. They are, by design, interchangeable and therefore, equally scalable and can be mobilized in whole or part as needed.

Given the basic interchangeability of these units it makes sense to focus on employment and sustainability timelines and models for both short notice and advance notice missions as well as short and long duration missions. Any discussion of scalability across the force needs to include a discussion of sustainability over time as well as maintaining deployable force packages to meet simultaneous theater engagements. Here, cost plays an obvious part in the discussion. According to the 2013 CAPE Study, an Army National Guard BCT is significantly less expensive in dwell and mobilization years. Greater reliance on ARNG BCTs can stretch a limited budget while retaining scalable combat capability. The AC will still need to remain our nation's 'fight tonight' force for no-notice overseas contingencies, however most other missions can and should include NG participation. Blended BCTs would provide even greater scalability and utilizing the phased resourcing model discussed later in this paper (page 31), significant gains in both scalability and efficiency could be made.

b. Cost-Efficiency: '*achieves cost-efficiency between the regular and reserve components of the Army, manages military risk, takes advantage of the strengths and capabilities of each, and considers fully burdened lifecycle costs.* '

The Nation is faced with challenging, budgetary constraints that require a flexible, cost effective solution to national defense. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy stated that current personnel costs in the Department of Defense (DoD) are unsustainable (Reserve Forces Policy Board 2014, 12). The Army National Guard is part of the solution to lower those costs and help our total force cope with today's constrained budgets. The Army National Guard contributes 39% of the Army's operational forces for about 15% of the Army's budget and accounts for less than four cents of every dollar America spends on defense. Even accounting for the additional support from AC appropriated funds, the Guard still comprises less than one-fifth of the Army budget. At the individual Soldier level, a non-mobilized Guardsman costs just 25-33% as much as an AC Soldier (Army National Guard, 2013). Even when mobilized, a Guardsman is still less expensive (80-95%) than an AC Soldier due to multiple factors including limited retired pay, health care, moving costs, education, family housing, commissaries, infrastructure costs and other personal benefits relative to AC Soldiers(DOD Unit Costs and Readiness for the AC and RC, 2013). There are three important areas in which the Guard provides significant cost savings compared to the AC; personnel costs, unit costs, and DoD-wide benefit costs.

Individual compensation is much higher in the AC than in the reserves. In 2013, the average difference in compensation between an O-5 pay grade in the U.S. Air Force compared to that of an Air Force Reserve or Air National Guard O-5 pay grade was about $150,000 (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013). The compensation difference between Active and Reserve Component E-7 and E-4 pay grades are just as significant. It costs about $85,000 and $50,000

more per year in the AC to compensate an E-7 and an E-4 respectively compared to their RC counterparts (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013). Simply using these three AC service members' pay differences as a point of reference, the tax payer saves a total $295,000 per year if these three service members are in the reserve component.

There is a sharp contrast in DoD-wide benefits as well. DoD-wide benefits include military healthcare, post-retirement, pre-Medicare costs, family housing, and family support programs. The primary reason for the stark difference in costs is that RC service members are not eligible for post-retirement, pre-Medicare coverage until they are 60 (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013). Additionally, traditional RC service members are not authorized family housing or allowances, and use family support programs sparingly. When combining all of these cost centers, each RC service member provides a $21,000 per year savings to the tax payer as opposed to paying all of the services that active duty members enjoy (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013).

The annual cost to man and train an AC BCT compared to a Guard BCT is significant. In 2013 an AC BCT in dwell costs about $270M per year while a Guard BCT only costs $66M (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013). The cost for the activation of an AC BCT totals $285 million compared to the $163 million cost to activate a Guard BCT. It is less expensive to man and train a Guard BCT compared to an AC BCT during both dwell and mobilization.





According to the 2013 OSD Report an ARNG BCT is less expensive in dwell and mobilization years

In the report "Assessing the Army's Active-Reserve Component Force Mix" by the Rand Corporation, they wrongly assert that the RC often costs more to deploy than the AC. They cite the U.S. Department of Defense policy that permits reserve units to deploy less often than AC units (Rand Corporation, 2014). They use a Military Police Company and an Apache Attack Battalion for their cost examples (Rand Corporation, 2014) when an Army BCT is the most prevalent unit in the Army and a more accurate representation for overall costs and readiness. They also assume a very aggressive deployment schedule (Rand Corporation, 2014). It is unlikely that our nation will need to maintain that deployment schedule on a continued basis that justify the study's cost assumptions. They fail to include retirement costs including pensions and

pre-Medicare coverage; both very large expenses. Finally, they assume that training lead times for the Reserve Component need to be lengthy for large units (Rand Corporation, 2014). This is a poor assumption. Lead train-up times decreased significantly during the GWOT. In the first years of the war, it was not uncommon to have a five month train-up that both the AC and Guard concluded was unnecessary and often unfocussed on theater realities. Near the end of these conflicts a 40 to 45 day train-up was more common for Brigade size elements. **This study was narrowly focused and not representative of the real cost differences between the Active Army and the Army National Guard**.

c. Capacity: '*ensures that the regular and reserve components of the Army have the capacity needed to support current and anticipated homeland defense and disaster assistance missions in the United States*.'

Army National Guard units and structures are broadly capable and highly responsive to the operational requirements of our nation. While the primary training focus of Guard combat formations is the same as that of their active counterparts, Guard units tend to more naturally meet the model of adaptive units envisioned by the Army's Operating Concept. Their very composition, including a broad variety of military and civilian skillsets endemic to every Guard unit create the flexibility to meet the operational challenges of the 'unknown and unknowable future' (TRADOC, 2014).

For hundreds of years the Guard has adhered to its Minuteman heritage of being ready at a moment's notice to pick up its rifles and fight. The commitment to that ethic is the same whether a mission is at home or abroad. The notion the Guard is principally a domestic response force with some military capabilities is a mythology perpetrated by those who misunderstand its fundamental nature or are threatened by its efficiency. The fact is the Guard executed the same missions as similar formations of active component units and brought the same capabilities to bear.

Guard units maintain the same force structure and equipment but also bring to the fight, experience in a broad variety of disciplines coupled with pride, heritage and a dedication to the same Warrior Ethos shared by all American Soldiers. What is often misunderstood outside the Guard community is that the Guard is by its inherent nature a rapidly deployable operational force and has been since its inception. Guard units routinely deploy in hours, not days or months, and frequently operate on timelines paralleled only by the rapidly deployable forcible-entry formations such as the Global Response Force (GRF). The National Guard deployed rapidly by both ground and air, in rotary and fixed wing chalks, on busses and in the backs of military trucks. These rapid military operations differ fundamentally from combat deployments only in their physical locations and in some cases security posture. Calling something a Military Support to Civil Authorities response in no way diminishes the operational requirements of the mission or makes it somehow less complex or less military than a similar mission conducted in a combat zone. The threats encountered may be different but the processes, personnel and equipment are all military. These missions similarly tax the capability and agility of Soldiers and leaders and require complex synchronization and execution.

Over the past 14 years of sustained conflict the Guard has demonstrated an unparalleled ability to concurrently execute a broad set of military operations. The list represents some of the more notable major operations and exercises supported by the California Army National Guard during that time. These military operations were conducted concurrently with the deployment of more than 27,000 Soldiers overseas during the same period. In many cases these operations required immediate no-notice deployment of thousands of Army Guard personnel, many arriving at their armories and forward deploying within hours of initial call-up.

This list does not include the hundreds of smaller missions or training exercises that occurred or the multiple federal Overseas Deployment for Training and State Partnership missions. It illustrates that the Guard retains the capacity to not only execute a broad mission set but do it simultaneously in multiple statuses and in multiple theaters

Recent CA Army National Guard major Domestic Support and Emergency Response operations and exercises:

- Operation Gulf Coast Relief: 2005-2006 (Multiple concurrent CNG missions in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005).
- Operation AEROSHIELD: 2006 (Major Airport security mission to seven of California's major international airports)
- Operation Fall Blaze: 2007 (Major limited-notice joint interagency firefighting response and security operation in San Diego).
- Operation Jump Start: 2008 (Major CNG security deployment to the southern US border with Mexico).
  Operation Lighting Strike: (Northern California Wildfires)
- Vigilant Guard 2008 (Nevada Earthquake exercise on the Mt. Rose Fault Line: Reno)
- United Response 2011 (Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake exercise)
- United Response 2013 (San Francisco Bay Area Earthquake exercise)
- Operation Lighting Strike II 2014: (Northern California Wildfires)
- Vigilant Guard 2015 (Hurricane Response to Hawaii)
- Ardent Sentry 2015 (Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake exercise)
- Wildfire Response 2015 (Butte, Amador, Lake, Calaveras and Kern County Wildfires)
- Search and Rescue (multiple year round 2005-2015)

Even at the height of CA Army Guard deployments in 2005-2006 when more than half of CA Army Guard was deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere overseas, the force continued to receive and execute missions back home. Soldiers join the Guard to execute operational missions, and do so with great frequency. The Guard provides a capacity and depth to the Total Army that could not be replaced even by active forces at a much higher cost. The National Guard is not a secondary or complementary force when it comes to executing the Nation's missions any more that the active component is secondary or complementary to the Guard. They are both essential elements of a capable, effective total army.

d. Personnel Base: *'provides for sufficient numbers of regular members of the Army to provide a base of trained personnel from which the personnel of the reserve components of the Army could be recruited.*'

The premise that the National Guard requires any base of active component personnel to execute its mission is false. The modern National Guard receives the same training and operational experiences as their active counterparts: they go to the same schools, deploy to the same countries and shoot the same weapons. In addition the Guard brings in significant amounts of training and experience from outside the military that is routinely applied to military operations. The National Guard and its predecessors were aggressively protecting the foundation of this nation for 139 years before the active component existed and has continued to protect it ever since.

Recruit/Year	2012	2013	2014	2015
AC to ARNG	450	509	357	326
New Recruit	1887	1920	1530	1265
Total	2337	2429	1887	1591
% of AC of Total	19.26%	20.91%	18.91%	20.49%

Each year the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve enlist between 120,000 and 160,000 individuals to maintain their respective strength levels (CA ARNG G1 Report, 2015). Although it is beneficial from an efficiency standpoint to retain the skills and capabilities that Soldiers gain while serving on Active Duty and absorb them into the Guard and Army Reserve. It is a fallacy to assume that Active Duty is the primary feeder of new recruits to both reserve components. Active Component service members provide only 20% of the RC's accession (CA ARNG G1 Report, 2015), with a majority of non-prior service recruits only wanting to serve as members of the Guard and Reserves.

All Army National Guard members are required to go to the same training for Basic Training, Advanced Individual Training (AIT), and advanced career-developing schools as active component Soldiers, as well as the same specialty schools such as Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger School, etc. The notion that the Active Army needs to provide trained soldiers to the Guard in order to be a mission-capable component of the total force is a fallacy, and greatly discounts the skills and experience the modern Guard brings to the total force. By design, the Army National Guard is scalable and interchangeable and provides Soldiers that are equally trained and qualified as their Active Duty counterparts to meet the broad mission set envisioned in the Army's operational concept.

It is also important to understand that modern Guard members enlist to serve. The vast majority of today's National Guard is comprised of Soldiers that joined after 9/11 with full knowledge that they would likely be deployed and serve in combat. This is the identical mindset shared by their active component counterparts, the only difference being the opportunity to pursue a

civilian career, obtain higher education full-time and remain within their community. Things may have been different a half-century ago during the Vietnam conflict where some individuals may have sought the Guard out as a sanctuary to avoid combat, but that was less the fault of the Guard than of a policy that failed to utilize the Guard effectively for its combat mission. The Abrams doctrine corrected that mistake.

e. Operational Tempo and Dwell ***'****maintains a peacetime rotation force to avoid exceeding operational tempo goals of 1:2 for active members of the Army and 1:5 for members of the reserve components of the Army'*

The concept of fixed operational tempo as characterized by the 1:2, 1:5 dwell was, and remains, arbitrary. It was well meaning, and intended to bring predictability and normalcy to military deployment cycles. Though these were commendable goals the reality , as articulated by the '*unknown and unknowable'* conflicts envisioned in the Army's Operating Concept, is that global conflict and mission requirements are fundamentally unpredictable and do not translate efficiently into fixed dwell rations. Recognizing this fact the Adjutant Generals have called for the wholesale elimination of any standardized dwell model in favor of a more adaptive system that allows the use of Guard forces wherever or whenever they are needed for as long as the mission requires.



The graphic above demonstrates that over the last fifteen years, the California Army National Guard supported the mobilization of over **27,000 Soldiers** to support Combatant Commanders in named operations to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Guantanamo Bay, Djibouti (Horn of Africa), the Sinai, and other locations across the globe (CAARNG G3,Weekly Status Report, 2015).

California Guard operations include counterdrug, southwest border, and other locations within the Continental United States. The California Guard regularly maintains a high OPTEMPO and conducts a discreet military response operation on average every three days on top of its federal deployments. Even though the DoD Directive 1235.10 implies that a 1 to 5 dwell exists, in practice Guard units routinely exceed these requirements with multiple deployments well within that construct. The following is a graphic depiction of CA ARNG GWOT mobilizations since 9/11 and does not include state operations or Title 32 missions.

The following chart depicts overall ARNG mobilizations over a similar timeframe and demonstrates the ability of the Guard to meet mission, whatever that mission may be. (



Part of the discussion of operational tempo for the Guard has been about maintaining sufficient operational capability for the homeland. The premise of that discussion is the notion that a sufficient number of forces, Guard forces, should be held in reserve for disaster response. Although well-intended this notion (not a formal policy) ignores two highly relevant facts. First, the states work together within a national framework to respond to emergencies so that regardless of the federal deployment status within any given state there are always significant response elements available. There is no better illustration of this than when Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005 while Louisiana's 256th Infantry BCT was deployed to Iraq. Despite the absence of their primary maneuver force, Louisiana's Guard was able to rapidly respond with the assistance of more than 50,000 National Guard personnel from 24 states (Kamp, 2012). The second fact is that emergency response, homeland security and homeland defense are not the exclusive responsibility of the National Guard any more than warfighting is the exclusive responsibility of the active component Army. In any emergency response, particularly a major

one, the US can, and will, bring to bear all forces necessary to meet the mission. This has been demonstrated routinely in the past decade since Katrina and advances in doctrine and statute such as the emergence of Dual-Status Command have made the employment of multiple component of the Army more seamless.

Another notion that frequently enters into OPTEMPO/dwell discussion is so-called "deployment fatigue " It has been brought up either by well-meaning individuals concerned about the toll of deployments on the force, or by those seeking to gain political advantage. Whether well-intentioned or not, there is no data to support that deployment-fatigue exists, or has ever existed within the Guard or among employers. It, along with other mythology surrounding Guard readiness, is not useful in this discussion of the future Total Army.

What is useful is the development of a post-ARFORGEN construct that achieves the adaptability and flexibility that our nation requires. Deployment decisions ought to be made with operational needs at the forefront. There are many solutions that can also add an element of predictability such as routinely bringing Guard units to active duty during a ready year and using them for whatever contigency or training requirement happens to exist at that time. This solution conserves active component endstrength while providing immediately ready forces in a predicatable pattern. Another solution (addressed later in this paper) is a phased readiness contruct that provides a continuum of ready units rather than the 'either/or' active or reserve situation that exists now .

Whatever solution is arrived at, it should be based on fact, and utilize the full capability of the Total Army across its entire mission set including combat operations, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, homeland defense and homeland security. Predictability is a lesser consideration in this discussion and ought to be suborned to operational need and efficiency.

f. Strategic and Operational Risk ***'manages strategic and operational risk by making tradeoffs among readiness, efficiency, effectiveness, capability, and affordability'***

Limiting strategic and operational risk in this context is about providing military capability that meets the nation's strategic and operational needs within the constraint of available resources. In theory the more broad based capability you have, the less risk is assumed. In each instance in this discussion a cost/benefit framework should be applied and the question should be asked: "what is the least expensive means of achieving a given strategic or operational imperative." Where two solutions provide similar results, you go with the cheaper one.

This paper has repeatedly asserted that the personnel and formations within the Guard well-trained, motivated and capable of successfully executing both their federal and state requirements and do so at a relatively low cost. It has also asserted that the Guard is ready to fight tonight in the homeland and does so routinely, and with greater frequency than its active counterparts. Despite these assertions, and the general interchangeability of these forces, it is wrong to assume that the forces should be employed in identical manners. Just because a National Guard infantry battalion or brigade could mobilize rapidly and get on the same C17 to

be employed overseas as an active unit, that doesn't mean it should. There are clearly some appropriate roles that can be better served by the active force, and since we are already paying for them, should be directed towards them.

A practical look at the strategic and operational problem set demonstrates that there are routine, predictable and in-extremis mission requirements for our forces, and that even an in-extremis requirement can become routine after an initial response. For example, the Korea mission has become both largely predictable and routine. Although the stakes are potentially still very high, on any given day our planners can predict and adjust the mission requirements with regularity. In Afghanistan, a once unforeseen and in-extremis requirement has become routine for our Army. Even the fluid crisis in Ukraine has an air of predictability about it; the Army generally knows how it is going to handle operations there unless something drastic changes. This is the case with so many of our Army's mission sets. A new mission comes up, predictably or not, a force is sent in, and after some period it becomes routine, not easy, just routine.

The above discussion is important because for in-extremis or unanticipated requirements it is useful to have, and pay for, a broad spectrum initial entry capability that is able to rapidly project combat power outside of the CONUS.. That capability needs to span the realm of Joint Operations and include forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. Within the Army's piece of that it would only make sense that this initial entry/response come from the active component. This type of mission specifically is the best argument for maintaining a broadly capable active component army. This should not presume however that the current force mix is correct or that significant gains in efficiency couldn't be made by blended forces or other innovative constructs such as the phased readiness model discussed later in this document. As time passes in any given operation the requirement for initial entry forces diminishes and rotational forces take over. There is no reason those forces need to be principally from the active component. Under the current operating construct this would mean that for even the most complex missions a maximum of 90 days would be needed to employ Guard forces, and for most practical purposes much less. So the question really becomes what capability does the active component need to maintain to meet its initial entry requirements. Beyond that period there is a strong argument for maximizing capability and affordability by relying on a large operational reserve.

Maintaining combat power in the Army National Guard provides the nation with ready combat formations at an affordable cost and at negligible additional risk in terms of capability and effectiveness. In terms of readiness, that is mostly a function of resourcing. Greater resources generally equate directly to greater readiness. Later in this paper we suggest a model for a more graduated method of resourcing that provides significantly greater capability across a spectrum of employment instead of the current two-option choice we have today. The bottom line is that the readiness of Guard formations can be adjusted according to the resources provided and even at the relatively minimal resourcing the Guard draws now it has still demonstrated itself to be highly capable and responsive. We should capitalize on the strengths and experiences of this dynamic force and truly integrate them as a seamless part of our total Army.

IV. The Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative. *'conduct a study of a transfer of Army National Guard AH-64 Apache aircraft from the Army National Guard to the regular Army'.*

The Army response to the Budget Control Act was to restructure Total Army aviation in a manner that ultimately degrades strategic capability without a significant reduction in cost savings. The choices made by the Army in this plan undercut the Total Army concept by creating inherent differences active army and Guard formations and by failing to retain the capability and experience of some of Americas best attack aviation crews and support personnel. An alternative plan referenced here and submitted both to the GAO and to this Commission offers a more strategically viable alternative that maintains the Total Army concept and does so at a similar price point.

The Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) seeks to change Aviation doctrine by removing combat aircraft from the National Guard's Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs), and changing these CABs into Combat Support Aviation Brigades. This controversial plan proposes to retire the Vietnam era OH-58 Kiowa Scout Helicopters and replace them with AH-64 Apache Gunships transferred from the National Guard to the active component, eliminating all attack aviation in the Guard nationwide. This proposal would fundamentally change the construct of the National Guard CAB making it less than lethal and reducing it to a support function, fundamentally a retreat from the Abrams doctrine. This also severely constrict the AH-64 talent pool and erode continuity of experienced pilots. An additional consequence of ARI is the retirement of the TH-67, replacing it with a significantly more expense training platform.

The Militia Act of 1903 specifically requires the Guard to conform to the standards of the active component. This was reinforced again in a 1993 off-site agreement which also realized the wisdom in maintaining a Guard that reflected the active component as the primary combat reserve (Duckworth, 2007). Guardsmen and active-component service members have attended the same schools, trained on the same equipment and operated under the same doctrine. Identical Combat Aviation Brigade structure in the Active and Reserve Components provides the best value and capability for our nation

The 54 State Adjutant Generals were not consulted in regards to ARI. It has become clear to many Army National Guard Senior Leaders that the Active component made its decision and uninterested in hearing from the Guard on the matter. In taking this approach the active component leadership chose to reinforce the troubling notion that it viewed the Guard as a secondary force, and despite the presence of a Guard general on the Joint Chiefs, not worth genuinely consulting in this matter.

There remains a wide spectrum of possible solutions to cutting costs in Army Aviation. The California National Guard (CNG) strongly supports a look at all options regarding Army Aviation, not just a verdict on the existing Army and National Guard Bureau plans. The CNG submitted a report to the GAO and the NCFA to ensure that it has the most accurate picture of the issues pertinent to ARI. This plan demonstrates that the States' Alternative Proposal drafted by National Guard Aviators which is more cost-efficient than ARI or the NGB proposal,

maintains an effective operational reserve, retains adequate combat capability in the Active Component, and complies with regulatory authorities.

After staff analysis of data and reports that have been used to inform the discussion on ARI, the CNG recommends that DoD pursue an alternative to both ARI and NGB's proposal. This third option, referenced in this document as the States' Alternative Proposal, would reduce the overall size of the aviation fleet, address the Active Component's requirements for its operational fleet and reduce the number of Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) in the Army National Guard, while still providing a strategic reserve.

a. Summary of the States' Alternative Proposal:

The States' Alternative Proposal is based on the capability of the Apache to exceed the Kiowa's in fulfilling the role of attack/reconnaissance. As demonstrated below, the States' Alternative Proposal posits that a Kiowa has 60% of the capability of an Apache. Under the States' Alternative Proposal by airframe, AH-64 Apache allocation would be:

420 AC Modified Table Of Equipment (MTOE)

126 ARNG Modified Table Of Equipment (MTOE)

70 Ft. Rucker Flight School

25 Research/Test and Operational Ready Fleet

49 Boeing remanufacturing line

690 Total

The Army National Guard fleet would comprise 126 Apaches under this plan. The Apaches would be organized into three attack reconnaissance battalions of 24 aircraft and three attack reconnaissance squadrons of 18 aircraft.

By formation, the States' proposal would organize:

- 10 AC CABs
    - 10 ARBs with 24 Apaches each
    - 10 ARSs with 18 Apaches each
- 3 ARNG CABs
    - 3 ARBs with 24 Apaches each
    - 3 ARSs with 18 Apaches each

The Active Component Army has claimed it needs all 690 of the Army's Apaches in the Active Component, including 210 in its non-operational fleet. Accurate assessment of the Kiowa's capabilities as compared with the Apache, however, show the Army could perform its missions with 420 Apaches.

The table below shows the Apache has faster speed than the Kiowa as well as greater range, higher combat ceiling, longer station time, better sensors and survivability. That difference in capability is demonstrated by the difference in the price as well.

(Kiowa has 60% the capability of an Apache)

Metric	Kiowa	Apache
Cost	$11M	$35M
Station Time	2 hours 140 Mile Range	3.5 Hours 360 Mile Range
Performance	7,500 Foot Combat ceiling 95 knots Cruise Speed	12,000 Foot Combat Ceiling 120 Knots Cruise Speed
Sensors	1 FLIR - Targeting Only, 3XMag	2 FLIR targeting/pilotage, 36XMag
Survivability	Single Engine	Dual Engine
OR Rate	Average 60%	Average 80%

These metrics demonstrate that the Active Component Army can perform its mission with about 40 percent fewer Apaches than Active Component leaders have stated.

States' Alternative Proposal assumptions, constraints and limitations:

Assumption 1: Assuming risk in the non-operational fleet is more prudent than assuming risk in the operational fleet. This proposal would increase the size of the operational fleet and decrease the non-operational fleet.

Assumption 2: It is unlikely the Army's entire Apache fleet would ever be deployed at once. Throughout the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq the entire Apache fleet was never deployed; only portions were deployed. Most of the time since 2001, there were more Apaches in the United States than there were in Afghanistan and Iraq combined.

Assumption 3: Kiowa fleets often have up to 40 percent of their aircraft grounded for maintenance issues, while Apaches often have less than 20 percent grounded. Apaches have a far greater mission-ready rate than Kiowas.

Assumption 4: Leaving 48 Apaches in an equipment only set for rotating units is not cost-efficient. ARI would leave an entire CAB's equipment outside the U.S. for use by a rotating brigade of Soldiers. This means there would always be 48 Apaches in the United States that are unmanned and unused.

As a contribution to this effort the California National Guard analyzed the Aviation Restructure Initiative, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau's proposal, the Department of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), reports and an alternative proposal drafted by National Guard aviators. The full report of this proposal as well as references and comparisons of

the other proposals has been submitted to the NCFA and is posted on the website reading room labeled (**Input for GAO Report on ARI Stemming from the NDAA**). We identified sources, where available, that communicate each competing proposal. These sources include Army and National Guard briefings, white papers and National Guard committees' correspondence on the topic produced over the past year.

V. Way Ahead

The following section addresses possibilities for future action and reform directed towards the end state of a seamless Total Army. Although actionable in many respects, these ideas are primarily meant to provoke thought and discussion over some key points of both friction and opportunity facing our force.

a. Personnel and Systems

1. Continuum of Service/ Intra Component Service:

The current personnel and retirement systems create barriers to seamless service in multiple components of our Army. This limits the talent pool available to each component and presents barriers to the continuum of service that better support both the fluid needs of the Army as well as the personal aspiration and circumstances of the individual.

The phrase "continuum of service", as generally understood, would facilitate the seamless transition of individual Soldiers on and off of active duty to meet mission requirements and would permit different levels of participation by the service member over the course of a military career. In practice, this has been allowed somewhat through breaks in service by active personnel and by temporary tours afforded to reservists, but true interoperability has not been achieved. To support the continuum, better systems and policies need to be established that encourage active-duty members to serve in the Guard or Reserve when they no longer want to pursue a full-time military career or simply need a temporary change from full-time service. The same opportunities for switching to active service more seamlessly could be provided to reserve personnel. The continuum of service concept would facilitate ease of transfer between the Active and Reserve Components and begin to eliminate the unhelpful distinctions between "Active Duty" and "Reserve or Guard" personnel in favor of simply "Soldier."

A significant portion of the Total Army has had the opportunity to gain experiences outside the military through their civilian employment. As a result of their civilian occupations, reserve Soldiers have a wealth of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational and Corporate experience that is collectively priceless to our total force. It is also priceless because it general comes at no cost to the military. Valuing these skills and experiences is something that is not currently integrated into readiness standards despite the fact that in many cases they may greatly enhance the abilities of any given personnel or collective unit to execute their mission.

Transition of these personnel among components will enhance the overall depth of the force and provide distinct advantages to all three components of our Army. As more personnel are able to bring the unique strengths and advantages of their component to another, understanding and agility will increase and misperception and division will decrease. Along with a system of open

and competitive talent management (discussed below) the Total Army can greatly improve its depth and readiness to effectively respond to future conflicts as well as provide its members needed flexibility to continue in prolonged military service.

2. Open and Competitive Talent Management

Driven by competitive necessity, more corporate hiring models are using a decentralized pool to access their potential candidates. This significant shift in selecting employees based on talent rather than tenure depicts a less vertically integrated organizational model, shifting away from permanent pension jobs to more fluid and flexible working relationships that serve the employer and provide access to opportunity for the employee. Translating this practice to the Army could mean opening up a range of duty positions to qualified personnel within and among all components. This could produce greater competition and opportunity for personnel to move among components and provide greater depth to the force as a whole. The larger pool of talent and skills would greatly increase the Army's capability and allow the selection of adaptive and "outside the box leaders", regardless of component. The RC could gain quality personnel from the AC that were interested in either filling a full-time reserve billet or pursuing a civilian career, education, or just spending time in their home state as a parent. Likewise RC personnel could pursue AC assignments that would be career enhancing or personally developmental in the area they live or elsewhere. Most federal and state jobs are already filled in this manner. Like those jobs, clearly there would have to be a list of qualifying military experience and credentials for any given assignment.

America's highly regarded corporate talent managers (General Electric, Proctor & Gamble, Goodyear, IBM and others) have been using talent management IT systems for years to track the skills and qualifications of their personnel. The Army can and should modify its personnel system to more effectively track and report the education, skills, experiences, and attributes gained by all Soldiers throughout their military career as well as through civilian careers and experiences. Modifying Army personnel systems and processes to actively acknowledge and track these embedded RC member training experiences, skills and broadening experiences will provide a significant improvement in the Army's ability to tailor its capabilities to the demands of operational missions. The Army could also gain invaluable insights by seeking input and assistance from the reserve components as they seek to build truly adaptive leaders and teams.

Though significant, changes in hiring practices and talent management are achievable. Potential solutions such as the pilot program "Green Pages" (originally developed by the US Army Corps of Engineers and the United State Military Academy's Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis) exist today (OEMA, 2012). Green Pages would allow hiring managers to select a qualified officer from any component in order to gather the right skill sets for a mission/function. Similar to a USAJOBs or Tour of Duty announcement, multiple qualified candidates would compete for an assignment rather than be assigned by a branch manager. Joint qualifications and professional education would continue to be considerations for senior level assignments. In this model it is important to acknowledge that Reserve Component soldiers have commitments to a civilian employer and other constraints that control their time commitments when they are available for military service. By allowing them to pick/compete what level of service commitment they desire, it is a choice for a member of the Total Army to serve at their chosen level of service. The Army must adapt to ever-increasing competition for a shrinking pool of qualified individuals whose expectations about career paths and mobility are changing dramatically.

3. Common systems and benefits

Implementation of common military retirement system and an integrated pay and personnel system would be the cornerstone of the continuum of service and facilitate the seamless flow between active and reserve service. As a Service member departs active duty they have lost a significant investment in accrued benefits and must redevelop their HR footprint (ORB, I-PERMS). The push to reform military retirement gained momentum after the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission reported the results of a two-year study and developed a slate of detailed recommendations for Congress (MCRMC, 2015). The proposals on Capitol Hill call for reducing the size of the fixed-benefit pension by about 20 percent and adding a 401(k)-style benefit that would create individual retirement savings accounts that most troops would own and keep regardless of whether they serve a full 20-year career (Tilghman, 2015). Providing government contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan in a manner similar to the Federal Employee Retirement System, and retention incentives at critical career points, would be additional enhancements. Such changes would improve force management and provide for greater opportunities for both active and reserve Soldiers to serve in

a more flexible manner. This commonality would reduce barriers across the components and provide incentives to remain in service to the nation.

The proposal for a single integrated personnel management system for both Active and Reserve Component members would foster a continuum of service. All soldiers wear the U.S. Army nametape. The U.S. Army's personnel management strategies and the laws, policies, and systems that support them were designed during the middle of the last century. With Active, Reserve and Guard personnel directorates all developing niche systems to provide management of their HR population, personnel management has become a complex series of systems. With a functional release date of FY 2018; the Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A) could deliver a programmatic solution to support a true Continuum of Service concept (IPPS-A, 2015). A Soldier's career should be captured on a common HR management system and strategy. This would allow a soldier to serve in the Active Component and easily transition into the Reserve Component without delay. It is essential that the nation recognize these new strategic and demographic realities by developing a personnel management strategy for the new century and by reforming laws, policies, and systems to implement it.

b. Fully Integrated Force Structure

1. Background.

One of the common themes in creating a true "Total Army" has been the blending or association of units among components. In theory this would combine the advantages of each along with resources savings from utilizing reserve components and bring us closer together as teams because we would train and ultimately fight together. Round-out/round-up, multi-compo key leader assignments and other efforts have gone in starts and stops but none have remained long term or been integrated as doctrine. In our analysis these efforts failed in part because they didn't go far enough. We were, in Urdu parlance, *Shana Bashana*, but in our Army, that terminology is used to refer to working with our partners, not ourselves. The Army National Guard is not a partner with the Army, we are the Army, just as the other components are, no more no less. If we are to be One Army we need to start looking and acting like one Army. The proposal outlined in section 2 below is a concept rather than a detailed solution and, as with all the concepts addressed in this section, is meant to provoke discussion and forward movement. Having said that, as with all the concepts here are feasible, acceptable and sustainable, it is also meant to be achievable.

The coin of the realm in the Army is readiness. Ready, capable forces to fight and win our nation's battles. There are many other factors that define a force, but when it comes to "fighting tonight" readiness tends to win out (even on night 5,140 in Afghanistan). Readiness is tangible, metric-driven, and can be used to compare the status of different units. Success in readiness can be a combination of many things; leadership, training discipline, maintenance discipline and other factors all contribute, but paramount among these is resourcing. Resourcing ultimately means money: funding for personnel, equipment readiness and training. No amount of leadership or will, can overcome a fundamental lack of resources. And resources, rather than

will, competence, or leadership define the distinction in readiness between the components of America's Army.

The active component and National Guard have become mired in a circular argument where the AC says the Guard isn't ready enough and the Guard points out that the AC doesn't resource the Guard to be ready enough. Many Guard proponents would further argue that the Guard is amazingly ready considering the amount of resources it actually draws. Nonetheless the result is the same; that instead of a continuum of ready forces, the Army really only has two types: fully-funded and resourced active units, and partially funded and under-resourced reserve units. There are some nuances of course, the Global Response Force brigade of the 82nd, certain unit types within the reserves that are by necessity better resourced (aviation for example), and categories of professional reservists (doctors, lawyers, dentists) that require little or no post-mobilization training to execute their missions. But these exceptions are not the rule in the rest of the Army.

For the rest of the Army it's a two caste system, with some arguable hierarchies within those castes. The problem with the current system is not simply the natural divisions it creates, but the inherent lack of flexibility, agility and efficiency that it denies military planners forever faced with only two basic options for employing conventional forces. The following example illustrates one of the practical problems associated with the current model.

Without getting into a detailed discussion of air and sea lift capabilities, nature of conflict or what does or doesn't qualify as a valid mobilization training requirement, it is reasonable to assert that it would be a very tall order to launch all of the 28 CONUS-based active BCTs to arrive fully mission capable in any likely threat area in sooner than 30 days. Some would make it early, others would likely be late, possibly very late. And that assumes our adversary is unable to interdict that process and further assumes that the Division HQs, other C2 structures, all necessary logistics and all of the other military services are fully able to be moved in concert. After that, using current deployment standards and assuming a full-spectrum mission, an optimistic estimate would be for the earliest Guard BCTs to arrive FMC at the D+75 mark. Obviously that timeline could be abrogated significantly based on the extremity of the circumstance (California can put its IBCT on the street in 24 hours), but from a planning perspective those are the likely realities. Whatever math one accepts in planning for a 'full-employment' future conflict there is an obvious gap in response, a gap of 45 days in this simplistic model, much longer in others.

There is inherent subjectivity necessary in planning for the *unknown and unknowable* and the infinite variables associated with it. Although we use modeling to predict current threats, it is impossible to know today whether the 60 BCTs that currently resident in the Army inventory are sufficient to meet an unknown future. But if 60 is the number that we can afford, or are funded to, then the question is: what is the best way to allocate that funding to provide the greatest benefit in terms of readiness and capability?

The intent behind the following proposal it to create an alternate option for composing and resourcing Army units that maximizes readiness and capability and has the added benefit of finally arraying our force as the truly seamless total Army it ought to be. The BCT was chosen

to illustrate this principle because it is our Army's basic modular combat formation and is common to both the AC and the Guard. The principles suggested in this proposal are more broadly applicable beyond BCTs and are meant to illustrate the practical application of concepts such as continuum of service, intra-component service, common systems and other ideas intended to bring our force together.

It is also intended to better achieve the Army's operating concept of creating *"innovative and adaptive leaders and cohesive teams that thrive in conditions of complexity and uncertainty"* along with *"Army forces capable of conducting missions in the homeland or in foreign lands including defense support of civil authorities, international disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, security cooperation activities, crisis response, or large-scale operations" (McMaster, 2015)*

2. Phased Readiness (PR) Model for Integrated Brigade Combat Teams

The value of a BCT can be measured in simple terms of what can it bring to the fight, how fast, and at what cost. The model detailed below seeks to maximize capability, speed, and cost-effectiveness by fully integrating AC and RC forces into all BCT structure across the force and do it in a way that leverages the advantages of both. In this model Soldiers are no longer viewed as Guardsmen, Reservists, or Active, simply as Soldiers that at any given point in their career may happen to be full or part time.

The basics of this proposal are simple, all Army BCTs become fully integrated (in terms of component) from squad though BDE HQs level and be resourced against a phased readiness model that man's them according to how rapidly they will be expected to respond in fully-mission capable status. Instead of two types of units: 100% manned active duty units, and 3% manned Guard units, there will be a continuum of unit structures, in this model five of them, will be graduated in manning, and employable in phased deployment intervals. The manning in these structures will be identified either as "full-time" (encompassing today's Active Duty and Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Soldiers) or "part-time" (encompassing traditional Guardsmen and Army Reservists). This model assumes the current number of BCTs (60), remaining in their current components at their current numbers: 32 Title 10 BCTs and 28 Title 32 BCTs:

Phased Readiness (PR) Model



This model assumes 12 BCTs per PR interval (as described below), totaling the 60 BCTs that currently exist. It also assumes an overall loss of approximately 12,000 full-time billets in lower ranks to pay for the a more rank-heavy structure of full time personnel in critical billets for the purposes of maintaining high levels of readiness. Critical support functions in maintenance, logistics, operations and administration will tend to be full-time with a significant portion of leadership positions in all PR intervals being full-time. This does not eliminate those billets from the part time force, they just become scarcer, particularly in the lower phases. This requires a shift in mindset towards true continuity of service where a traditional reservist may choose to essentially take a "tour" in one of these positions and become full-time for the period of that assignment and then transition back when the assignment is complete, allowing them access to a full-range of qualifying assignments without committing to a full-time career in the military.

Each phase of BCTs will generally include a mix of BCT types: Heavy, Infantry, Stryker, Airborne with lighter forces prioritized towards earlier phases.

For the purposes of this model PR 1and 2 BCTs will exist in Title 10 status, whereas PR 4 and 5 BCTs will be in Title 32. PR 3 would split eight T-10 BCTs and four in T-32 BCTs. This is important under the current authorities construct to retain force structure in both statuses but at some point in the future could become an immaterial distinction as authorities evolve.

Although the current number of BCTs would remain under the C2 of their current components, there would be a significant shift in full-time personnel from Title 10 to Title 32 units. This shift might seem radical, but in reality the full-time Soldiers in the Title 32 BCTs would be largely

populated by personnel from today's active duty Army. It would just be another assignment for them before rotating to another T32 or T10 unit. This presumes some significant modifications to current personnel systems but is very much in keeping with continuum of service, breadth in assignments and full implementation of the Total Army concept. The full-time and part-time endstrength of the Total Army wouldn't significantly change, it would just be a change in force mix, and more-importantly in culture.

Another benefit of the model would be a natural process of selection where individuals actively seeking high-optempo assignments would gravitate towards PR 1 and 2 units and those wanting lower optempo would gravitate to PR 3, 4 and 5 units. There would always be opportunity to transition among units, and in each of those units there would be room for transition between full and part time status. The full to part-time transition assumes a change in the retirement system on the Active Duty side, but that change appears to be coming already. For example after spending a couple tours in a PR 1 unit, a full-time Soldier might opt for service in a PR 3, 4, or 5 unit or perhaps transition to part-time service while pursuing a degree or having a child. For traditional reservists, they might opt to take a full-time tour in a key staff or leadership position before returning to their civilian job, or perhaps chose to serve multiple tours. All of these key positions would be competitive, so there would also be a natural process of selecting the best applicants for any given position.

In determining which positions would be full-time in a given unit versus part time, the full-time positions would be prioritized to readiness enhancing duties, and the duties that would require the least amount of post mobilization train up would be prioritized towards as part time billets.

General examples as follows:

PR1: 95% FTM except for certain specialties well-represented in the civilian sector. These would be personnel that were not essential to the daily operations of the Brigade and would mainly need to be present for tactical field problems, exercises and deployments. They would receive enhanced authorization for additional training.

PR2: 75% FTM. Generally all key staff and mission support personnel and all leadership slots down to squad leader level would be FTM. Riflemen and team leaders would be part time. Again, these personnel would receive enhanced authorization for additional training and attend all tactical training.

PR3: 50% FTM. Most key staff and mission support personnel and leadership slots down to platoon leader/platoon sergeant level would be FTM. Squad leader and below would be part time.

PR4: 25% FTM. Some key staff and mission support personnel and leadership slots down to company commander/first sergeant level would be FTM. All others would be part time.

PR5: 5% FTM: Only critical staff in operations and sustainment and critical readiness personnel would be FTM, all others would be part time.

Although leadership and upward mobility would be limited for many part-time personnel assigned to PR1-3 units, those personnel would be able to opt for a tour leadership assignment or transfer to a PR 4 or 5 unit, or take a full-time billet elsewhere in the Guard or reserves.

Stationing: This is generally adaptable to the current BCT posture in terms of unit type (IBCT, SBCT, HBCT and ABCT), location, and general infrastructure. Stationing turbulence would be largely non-existent for PR 1 and 5 units that would look very similar to how they do currently. PR2 and 4 units would undergo moderate, but very achievable transitions and systems are currently in place for housing and medical care on the economy for instance for PR4 units. Stationing consideration would need to be given to designating those units that are best able to support transition. Largest transition would be for PR 3 units, and particularly for those units remaining in Title 32. For the Title 32 units, they would most likely be aligned against locations with significant existing military infrastructure. For T10 PR 3 units it may create more dispersion as traditional active facilities may be combined with outlying armories to support the Brigade.

In terms of operation benefit the following charts depict the differences in deployability between the current system and the proposed concept. Both models assume an immediate no notice conflict with a full commitment of the Total Force. This assumes nearly full availability of air and sealift resources which this model assumes an average three IBCT, ABCT or SBCT every three to five days for strategic lift, and HBCTs required an average 23-25 days of sail time for sealift considerations. (Vick, 2003).



Current Model of deployment capability over time. This assumes nearly full availability of air and sealift resources as well as immediate notice for NG Forces and 90 days of post-mobilization training requirements.



Phased Readiness Deployment Model. This assumes full availability of air and sealift of and varying degrees of post mobilization training requirements: 0 days for PR1, 20 Days for PR2, 40 Days for PR3, 60 Days for PR4, and 80 days for PR5 units.

The relative advantage of the phased readiness model is that it provides for a continuous flow of forces and puts significantly more forces on the ground in the first 90 days,

Considerations:

Multi-phased Divisions: Although this concept is focused on BCTs it is easy to envision adapting elements of this model to the division structure. It may make sense to take Divisions such as the 82nd, ABN, 101st AA, 2nd ID and keep them and their associated BCTs PR1 pure, but most other divisions could contain a mixture of phased forces and a mixture of FTM and PTM within their HQ. The advantage of multi-phased Divisions would be that they would allow for greater continuum of service within the Division or within a general geographic area.

Other Army elements: The concepts presented in this section are ultimately designed to be portable beyond maneuver Brigades and Divisions. There are exceptions, most overseas billets and most functions that need to occur daily to maintain general administration logistics and operations would still need to be full time. But much of the rest of the entirety of the force could be truly and seamlessly integrated to the point where it the distinction between components was effectively immaterial.

Initial Execution: Initially units would be aligned by PR and the transition of personnel could take place over a period of 5-10 years with AC units drawing down and RC units building up until the transition was complete. That would also allow sufficient time for personnel, administrative and logistics systems to adapt.

Multi-Compo Units: The traditional view of blending has been through the use of multi-component units. In this model units such as Battalions or Brigades remain organic to their original component but are teamed with units from other components into a larger structure. A traditional Guard battalion, for instance might make up the third or fourth battalion of an Active BCT. This approach does create some integration and additional partnering opportunities but doesn't really create any significant operational gains. For this reason we focused on a more aggressively integrated solution.

Dual-Status Billets: In the phased concept, a significant number of current active billets would go to fill FTM positions in Phase 3 and 4 BCTs (and more as the concept is expanded). While initially this may appear to be a threat to active endstrength it is more correctly understood as simply a broadening or developmental assignment in another unit. The individual Soldier would retain dual-status on assignment to a Title 32 BCT and vacate that status upon assignment to a Title 10 BCT.

Full-time composition: The full-time manning of these units would differ by Phase. Initially Phase 1 FTM will be traditional Active Duty, Phase 2 through 4 would be a blend of Active, AGR (T10 and 32), and traditional T10 and 32 Soldiers of FTM developmental and leadership tours. Phase 4 would be primarily T32 AGR. As the system matures those distinctions will become much less relevant. There is no prohibition for instance for an FTM Soldier from a Phase 1 unit to transfer to a Phase 5 unit as FTM and there would certainly be a significant regular rotation of FTM between the phases in general.

Competitive active service: In the PR model, the great majority entry-level rifleman billets would be part-time. There would still be full-time rifleman billets in PR1 units, but that would be the exception. There would be full-time opportunities for enlisted soldiers once they became eligible to be NCOs and could compete for open leadership positions or readiness positions, but those positions would be competitive. If unable to outcompete their peers or unwilling to be full-time they could continue part time in a lower phase unit or opt for a different unit type altogether.

Enhanced readiness units: Certain Brigades, such as the current Global Response Force brigade, and forward stationed brigades would likely be resourced at 100% full-time manning depending on mission requirements.

Advantages for the Active Component: This model retains valuable combat experience within the Army. It provides for a far greater range of options for today's Soldiers and a greater likelihood for retention. It increases readiness and gets more Soldiers into the fight, sooner and with greater flexibility in force employment. It is inherently more modular and scalable. It increases the depth and adaptiveness of the T10 force by populating it with a portion of part-time Soldiers with civilian skill-sets and experience. This model will also allow for the retention of full-time authorizations within the Total Army.

Advantages for the National Guard: The Guard will become considerably more ready and relevant as a result of this concept. It will see significant increases in readiness and FTM,

resulting in more rapid and capable emergency response. It will also provide greater opportunities for developmental assignments and greater continuum of service for its personnel.

Advantages for the Army Reserve: It will see significant increases in readiness and FTM, resulting in more rapid and capable federal response force. It will provide greater opportunities for developmental assignments and greater continuum of service for its personnel.

Conclusion:

There are a number of significant benefits to this concept not the least of which come in readiness, capability and cost-effectiveness. And while there are implementation challenges, they are not insurmountable and a number of the foundational changes are already in progress. But beyond operational, fiscal and efficiency benefits, the fundamental benefit is that this concept fundamentally brings our force together a seamless total Army where distinctions in component become largely irrelevant and we serve together as a single force of American Soldiers.

c. Apportionment:

1. Background

The unique dual-mission of the National Guard provides ready forces for both state and national requirements. Governors rely on their National Guard forces to respond to a broad array of state contingencies, and the capabilities brought by those forces are an essential part of any state's emergency response framework. As a result, states are eager to gain as much Guard force structure as possible, particularly when that force structure is dual-purpose, meaning it can be readily employed for emergency response as well as its combat mission. The federal government also recognizes the value of these forces but is principally concerned the nation's security, and consequently with providing sufficient capability to the Guard to meet its wartime mission requirements. The challenge is finding the most effective and efficient balance between the needs of the Governors for robust response capability and the needs of DoD to align and resource its forces in a way that meets its global security priorities.

For many years these competing interests have played out politically and, rather than aligning and distributing forces based on operational need and fiscal objectivity, they either went to states with political influence or were simply divided via the Senate model in an attempt to please everyone. National Guard Bureau was caught in the middle and didn't necessarily have the capability to correct the issue and the resulting outcomes continued to be inherently inefficient and often made little sense operationally.

The same legislative language that created the NCFA now enumerates a specific requirement for it to review apportionment of the NG across each state, i.e., a look at the force structure and end strength that should be provided to each state. Specifically it requires:

"An identification and evaluation of the distribution of responsibility and authority for the allocation of Army National Guard personnel and force structure to the States and territories."

and

"An identification and evaluation of the strategic basis or rationale, analytical methods, and decision-making processes for the allocation of Army National Guard personnel and force structure to the States and territories."

This legislative effort is only a first step however as it seeks simply to identify the current processes; the real challenge will be to fix those processes to ensure that they are fiscally and operationally sound.

Unfortunately, the current model for NG apportionment does not adequately measure the need for the strategic use of the NG, particularly for larger states. This current model is based on a general spread of resources among 54 states and territories and not on operational and fiscally objective criteria that more appropriate to the distribution of such a critical resource.

This next section presents alternative models for the distribution of resources that are more strategically, operationally and fiscally sound. If appropriately adopted and employed these models will produce a much more beneficial result strategically and fiscally without degrading capabilities in either emergency response or the federal Warfighting mission.

2. A better model

Force structure decisions for the National Guard should be based first on the National Security needs of the nation and second, on preserving sufficient emergency response capability to rapidly respond to emergencies nationwide.

To meet the initial objective of National Security, force structure should be arrayed in a way that first promotes readiness; access to personnel, access to training, and access to medical, logistics and training support and is also proximate to ports of embarkation. To meet the needs of emergency response, this force structure needs to be relevant to likely emergency mission sets, and placed in response proximity to areas of high threat and population.

Under the current system, both these imperatives are routinely violated as force structure and personnel resources are allocated not based on readiness or response criteria but instead on the general concept of dividing resources among the states.

In this graphic the single state of California is overlaid on Eastern seaboard covering the area of multiple states, each one of which is authorized its own Joint force Headquarters and Army and Air National Guard. Current models of full-time manning (FTM), particularly within the Federal Technician system pay little attention to geography covered, population served or in some cases even the amount of Soldiers or force structure. This system creates massive disparities in FTM resources among the states, especially the larger and more populous ones.

Though population is not the sole criteria upon which force structure decisions should be made it is an important one. This is particularly true in areas of population density that can readily support an array of units and specialties and group them in ways that can greatly enhance accessibility and mutual support as well as the benefits that come with economy of scale when co-locating units. These tenets are essential in meeting the needs of both state and nation. The following models reflect these tenets;

Readiness-Based Resourcing

A primary consideration for the distribution of National Guard forces should be to areas that fundamentally support the readiness of a given force structure. Readiness consideration should be given to both the mission of the unit as well as to the support needs of the unit. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for instance, should be placed in areas where they can get adequate flight and training time, and also have access to work with units they will be supporting in combat. Brigade Combat Teams, for example, should be placed in areas that have adequate access to

maneuver training areas, adequate access to a large pool of personnel and should be able to support enough force structure so that the units in that brigade are geographically proximate if not co-located. Further, support force structure ought to be present to support existing maneuver forces. These formations should also be placed in proximity to adequate ports of embarkation; air, sea, and land, so that they may be rapidly deployed as necessary to support strategic and operational contingencies. This would also include proximity to partnered active component units where those associations exist.



The Mega regions highlighted in the chart about show significant population growth centers and their proximity to existing Army Installations. (Graphic Source: Center for Quality Growth and Regional Development (CQGRC, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009)

Mega region, is a clustered network of cities that share economic interests, landscapes and watersheds and key transportation corridors (Hagler, 2009). The significant growth in the mega regions would require increased resources to protect economic interests at the large regional scale (RPA, 2015). In the most simplistic terms, Army resources and force structure under this model should be placed near large growing population centers where there is access to training areas, railheads, ports and airports and are also proximate to supporting military units.

Though population alone is not a determining factor, it often brings with it the necessary readiness enhancements of training areas, railheads, ports and airports. As it relates to population, the large states remain seriously underresourced in terms of both personnel and force structure. The following chart details force allocations among sample states. When taken as a whole nationwide, the National Guard force structure represents 0.19% of a state's population per capita. When applied to states individually the disparity is striking, with smaller states being significantly over-allocated forces and larger states being significantly underallocated.

	Population	ARNG	Per Capita	Additional Forces required to match per capita
Larger State				
CALIFORNIA	38,802,500	16,655	1:2400	27,886
FLORIDA	19,893,297	9,974	1:2000	12,861
TEXAS	26,956,958	19,130	1:1500	22,835
Medium State				
HAWAII	1,419,561	3,063	1:500	1,629
KANSAS	2,904,021	5,113	1:600	3,333
KENTUCKY	4,413,457	7,280	1:600	5,066
Smaller State				
NORTH DAKOTA	739,482	3,200	1:231	848
SOUTH DAKOTA	853,175	3,230	1:264	979
VERMONT	626,562	3,600	1:173	719

In a state like California, for instance, the current ARNG endstrength is approximately 16,000 Soldiers, or 1 ARNG Soldier for approximately every 2,400 Californian's, in Arizona it's 1 per 1,300 and in Vermont it's 1 Army Guardsman for every 173 people. Using even the national average of 1 Army Guardsman for every 900 Americans, the California Army Guard should have an endtrength of 43,000 or more than 2.5 times its current size.

These factors matter and allocating force structure on the basis of non-operational and non-readiness related metrics will only result in a loss of capability and efficiency and achieve that lost at a higher cost to the taxpayer.

Threat Based Apportionment Model

The Threat Based Apportionment Model is useful in allocating emergency response force structure and should also be considered when allocating force structure and resources. Aligning forces adequately for national preparedness underpins all efforts to safeguard and secure the Nation against those threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk. In 2014, SEN Nelson (D-FL) proposed a move to reallocate the Guard forces among the states to the ones that have the largest threats (Nelson 2014). Under the model, the Army could develop force size and stationing based on threats to each state. The nation uses a baseline risk assessment to assess and track progress in reducing overall risk exposure. FEMA and Northern Command play an important role in developing, coordinating, and disseminating quality risk assessment data and tools right now to look at what we call the worst night in America (Grass, 2014). By adapting force apportionment baseline model using performance indicators from FEMA we can position forces to enhance national preparedness, mitigate hazards and vulnerabilities thus ensuring effective emergency response. Amongst the major threats facing the region is the real-time potential for truly massive, no-notice earthquakes; wildfires, floods. FEMA's catastrophic plan for a major earthquake in Southern California, for example, suggests damage that could include: 1,800 fatalities; 9,000,000 people being displaced and $200 billion in losses. (FEMA Region IX, 2015)

Another factor in apportioning against a threats based model should also be the proximity of regional assets. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) was put in place after Hurricane Andrew to allow for the mutual support of Guard forces between states (FEMA, 2006). Agreements like EMAC and other authorities can be utilized to support the regional distribution of resources so long as those resources remain readily deployable. Further enhancements to these agreements need to be made, as well as funding set aside, to make these provisions for the regional sharing of assets to be truly effective. Once that is accomplished every state will no longer be required to "have one" of every asset to ensure their residents are protected in times of emergency.

Apportionment Conclusion

Along with general changes in force structure and allocation in the Total Army, supporting changes in Guard force structure need to be made. The current disparities and inefficiencies in current Guard force structure allocation do not support national security, public safety, or fiscal reality and are in dire need of reform. The two models described here can be used in concert along with other considerations to provide a more rational basis for personnel, force structure and infrastructure resources.

d. Who speaks for the Guard?

When Congress asks the Chief of Staff of the United States Army (CSA) his view of the impact of a policy or issue facing his force he is expected to respond with his best military advice. Since the CSA is, after all, the ranking Soldier and Leader in the Army that advice is considered to be inherently legitimate. When Congress asks the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a similar question however, it should be made clear that he is being asked a question regarding a force he is, for most intents and purposes, no longer in. He now works as a member of the President's administration, answering to the President's Service Secretaries and Secretary of Defense. His budgets are principally controlled by the services and even his own chief deputies ultimately work for, and are appointed by, their parent services. His entire staff, in fact, serves on Title 10 as does the CSA and his entire staff, and the Chief of the Army Reserve and his entire staff. So the question remains, who then speaks for the 350,000 some members of the rest of the Army National Guard? It is not an easy question to answer since they are represented by some 54 different Adjutants General that answer to 54 different Commanders in Chief.

This challenge was made evident when the three component Chiefs testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee last year on topics affecting the Army including the Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI). In perhaps the most poignant illustration of this problem to date, when asked whether they supported ARI, each of the chiefs (with varying degrees of enthusiasm) said that they did, and the assumption was they were speaking for the services they represented. Any member of the Committee present that day would have no alternative but to assume that the components were in unanimous support of ARI. The problem with that assumption was that it was flat wrong as the Adjutants General of the 54 states and territories were concerned. They wear near unanimously opposed to ARI because it removed all attack aviation from the Guard and gave it to the active Army.

The Guard is an admittedly unique construct amongst the services because its very structure evokes the antithesis of "Unity of Command" so engrained within our military culture. While the active Army need recognize only a single "chain of command" for the entirety of its force, Guardsmen answer to 54 of these chains and another when federally activated. The Governors are clearly not in the President's Chain of Command and the Governors and Adjutants General don't necessarily share the administration's viewpoint, or those of the other states. And so, the problem of who speaks for the Guard is compounded, depending on the topic. The fact is that no one entity will ever be able to adequately represent every individual position within the Guard, but in areas where there is significant consensus among the states, those positions should be

aggressively proponed both with Congress and the Administration. Such should have been the case with ARI, but it was that lack of a voice that in part resulted in the formation of this Commission.

So in answering "Who speaks for the Guard?" really there need to be several answers:

The first is that the Chief or the National Guard Bureau should be formally compelled, through law or statute, to seek out and report the consensus views of the various states and territories where they exist, and report the alternating views where they do not. He should be required to present these views before Congress whether or not they conflict with the views of the Administration, and in fact, especially when they do not. By compelling the Chief in law or statute, he or she will not be habitually placed in the highly unenviable position of at times having to publically disagree with his boss, or alternately fail to speak on behalf of his constituents.

Next, recognizing this problem, Congress should actively seek the input of select Adjutant Generals when important topics such as ARI arise. They could be selected by topic expertise, by impact to their state or through some objective model of representation. The Adjutant General's Association, in which most Adjutants General actively participate, is another conduit.

Finally, National Guard Bureau, should empower the General Officer Advisory Council (GOAC) it created for this purpose and rely on it more vigorously to advise and support the Chief on matters impacting the Guard and the states.

Whatever means are adopted by the Administration, Congress or NGB to solicit the voice of the Guard, it is essential that this voice be heard. Today's Citizen Soldier is an integral and indispensable part of both our nation's warfighting and emergency response capabilities. We are very much part of the Total Army, but also represent the unique concerns and requirements of the various states and those viewpoints are critical to supporting effective policy and decision making for our total force.

VI. Final Points of Consideration

In analyzing the way forward concepts presented in this paper the Commission may wish to consider

1. The Army's ability to operate and win in a complex environment is dependent on developing innovative and adaptive leaders and cohesive teams that thrive in conditions of complexity and uncertainty. The total force must train to operate interchangeably both in culture and functionality to achieve this goal.
2. Total Army integration efforts have failed in the past due not necessarily to a failure in operational design, but a failure of culture and a failure of stakeholder buy in.
3. Leadership elements of the Active Army and Reserve components need to reduce barriers to Total Army Force Integration by aggressively changing organizational culture and acceptance of new ideas.
4. The Army School system can remove the channeling of components and encompass a larger total Army as a broader efficiency/ increase contact among components.
5. In order to implement significant and lasting change, recommendations made by the NCFA should include suggestions on implementation. Lessons learned from the Air Force following their Commission process should be considered in this respect.
6. Assessments of the Total Army need to be true and accurate from all parties. Manipulated facts and incorrect assertions will be costly and further delay Total Army Force Integration.

VII. Bibliography

1. Army National Guard, FY 2013 Annual Financial Report (Washington, DC: ARNG, 2014)
2. Brandt, Robert, *Déjà vu all over again/Silent War : The Relevancy of Army National Guard Divisions***,** NCFA public comments, 2015
3. CA ARNG. Aviation Report. Status Report, Sacramento: CA ARNG, 2015.
4. CA ARNG G1. Full-time Manning Report. Status Report, Sacramento: CA ARNG G1, 2015.
5. CA Army National Guard G3. Weekly Deployment Summary. Weekly Status Report, Sacramento: CA ARNG, 2015.
6. CA National Guard. J5 Sourcing Report. Status Report, Sacramento: CA National Guard J5, 2015.
7. California National Guard J3. Stationing Status Report. Status Report, Sacramento: California National Guard, 2015.
8. Commission on the National Guard and Reserve; Final Report 2008, "Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force"
9. Defense Department policy: DoD Directive 1235.12, "Accessing the Reserve Component".
10. Defense Department policy: DoD Directive 1235.10, Subject: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve".
11. Delk, Jim, *Roundout Brigades: a Historical approach*, NCFA public Comments, 2015
12. Duckworth, Raphael, *1993 Offsite Agreement Undermining Goldwater-Nichols and Special Forces Capabilities*; Strategy Research Project. 30 MAR 2007 U.S. Army War College.
13. Federal Emergency Management Agency, *EMAC Overview*, 2006, retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1726-25045-0915/060802emac.pdf
14. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Region 9 Hazards; retrieved from https://www.fema.gov/fema-region-ix-arizona-california-hawaii-nevada-pacific-islands
15. Field Manual Stability Operations, 3-07 October 2008, Headquarters Department of the Army. Retrieved from http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf on 20 AUG 2015

16. Freedberg, Sydney J, *Army Helo Cuts Save $176M A Year Over Guard Plan: CAPE* Breaking Defense.com , retrieved from: http://breakingdefense.com/2015/05/army-helo-cuts-save-176m-a-year-over-guard-plan-cape/

17. FY 12: Fort Leonard Wood Holiday Schedule 2012, retrieved on 5 NOV 2015: http://www.wood.army.mil/newweb/documents/holidaysfy12.pdf

18. Personal discussion with Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army staff member, May 2015, https://www.ipps-a.army.mil/

19. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Staff, 11 August 2011 Retrieved

20. Grass, Frank, Memorandum for Chief of Staff of the Army, National Guard Bureau. 2013 May

21. Greenhill, Jim, www.Army.mil, Grass: National Guard accessible, operational contributor to Total Force retrieved from http://www.army.mil/article/150337/Grass__National_Guard_accessible__operational_contributor_to_Total_Force/?from=RSS on 8 AUG 15

22. Godette, Brian. Army Reserve. June 17, 2015. http://www.usar.army.mil/resources/Pages/Active-duty-and-U-S-Army-Reserve-XVIII-Airborne-Corps-becomes-multi-component-force.aspx (accessed August 5, 2015).

23. Harry J. Thie, Roland J. Yardley, Peter Schirmer, Rudolph H. Ehrenberg, Penelope Speed. Factors to Consider in Blending Active and Reserve Man Power within Military Units. Research, Santa Monica, CA: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2007.

24. Hagler, Yoav "Defining U.S. Megaregions." New York, NY: Regional Plan Association. 2009

25. Kamp, Nina, Timeline of Military Deployments for Katrina Disaster Relief, The Brookings Institution, retrieved http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/homeland/katrinamilitarydeployments.pdf

26. Lund, John et al., Project AIR FORCE Analysis of the Air War in the Gulf: An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4269/4-AF, 1993.

27. McMaster, H.R. Continuity and Change, The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War, Military Review, March 2015

28. Military Recruitment 2010. June 30, 2011 https://www.nationalpriorities.org/analysis/2011/military-recruitment-2010/ retrieved on 21 August 2015

29. Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission, Final Report, January 2015

30. Nelson, Bill (D-FL) 8 APR 14,SASC Comments on Nat. Guard Force Allocation retrieved http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/14-04-08-army-active-and-reserve-force-mix

31. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Unit Cost and Readiness for the Active and Reserve Components of the Armed Forces. Report to Congress, Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013.

32. Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, Army Green Pages Proof-of-Concept, Pilot Report, 15 December 2012

33. Rand Corporation. Assessing the Army's Active-Reserve Component Force Mix. Research Report, Rand Corporation, 2014.

34. Reserve Forces Policy Board. Reserve Forces Policy Board Annual Report. Annual Report, Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014.

35. Reserve Forces Policy Board, (2013). Eliminating Major Gaps in DoD Data on the Fully-Burdened and Life-Cycle Cost of Military Personnel. Washington DC: Department of Defense

36. Regional Plan Association (RPA) National Issues 2015; retrieved from http://www.rpa.org/programs/national-issues

37. Tilghman, Andrew 2015. Military retirement reform gets Pentagon support, http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/benefits/retirement/2015/05/31/retirement-reform-chiefs/28088495/

38. Tan, Michelle, Army announces 10 brigade combat teams to be cut, Military Times.com, Jun. 25, 2013, retrieved from: http://archive.militarytimes.com/article/20130625/NEWS/306250042/Army-announces-10-brigade-combat-teams-cut

39. Temple, Herbert, *The Army of the Future must be fully integrated with the National Guard***,** NCFA public comments, 2015

40. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S Army Operating Concept, Win A Complex World 2020-2040 31 October 2014

41. Vick, Alan et al. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options, Project AIR FORCE Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-1606. 2002.

42. U.S. Department of Defense, *Unit Costs and Readiness for the AC and RC* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Report to Congress, December 20, 2013),